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Abstract
We propose electronic voting authentication scheme, which is a key management mechanism for electronic voting system
intended to limit the number of attacks on a polling station and strengthen the security control. The motivation is to diver-
sify security requirements of messages exchanged between polling stations. There are different types of messages
exchanged between polling stations and each type of message has different security needs. A security mechanism developed
on the basis of a single key is not enough to ensure the diverse security needs of voting network. In electronic voting
authentication scheme, every polling station is responsible to support three different types of keys. These are global key,
pairwise key, and individual key. The global keys are public keys shared with all polling stations in the voting network. The
pairwise key can be used for communication with polling stations. Individual keys will be used for communication with the
server. To ensure authentication of local broadcast, electronic voting authentication scheme uses one-way key chains in a
well-organized way. The support of source authentication is a visible advantage of this scheme. We examine the authentica-
tion of electronic voting authentication scheme on numerous attack models. The measurement demonstrates that elec-
tronic voting authentication scheme is very operative in protecting against numerous elegant attacks such as wormhole
attack, Sybil attack, and HELLO Flood attack. The proposed system is evaluated and the results demonstrate that the pro-
posed system is practical and secure as compared to the direct recording electronic and manual systems.
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Introduction
In almost all democratic countries, voting is practiced
regularly. The most common method used in elections
is the voting based on paper.1 The paper ballots are
used and the voters cast their vote physically. The
counting mechanism in these elections is manual.
The voter’s intent is estimated from a physical ballot.
The results are tabulated manually after the interpreta-
tion and reading of physical ballots.
The paper-based voting scheme may be used for
recounts. The recounts are applicable where automated
or mechanical counting systems are used. While this type
of voting systems is dominated by most of the election
systems conducted in different countries in terms of prob-
lems arose during the election. The reports of fraud or
cheat are frequently highlighted in these elections. The
reports may be due to voting itself or errors in counting
procedure. Many problems were documented in the pre-
vious years about the election process.2 The time required
for the election process and the result announcement are
other limitations of the manual voting systems.
Electronic voting (e-voting) technology may offer
advantages over the existing manual voting scheme.3
The speed of both counting and vote casting is
increased. The access to disable voters is granted with-
out visiting the polling station (PS). The e-voting is
conducted in many countries of the world, including
Europe, Australia, and United States. In Kuwait, an
attempt was made in 2005 parliamentary elections to
use e-voting, but the result was not satisfactory due to
a number of problems.4
However, conducting elections through e-voting has
a number of advantages over manual voting scheme,
but the issues related to usability, security, and credibil-
ity still exist. In the meantime, the e-voting is still in its
infancy and comparatively immature, which can be
improved from the lessons learned and experiences
gained through previous e-voting attempts. For exam-
ple, in United States presidential elections conducted in
2000, a number of issues in e-voting were reported.5
The objective of this research is to convey the experi-
ence of e-voting deployed at the University of
Malakand regarding usability, security, efficiency, and
satisfaction. The potential voters are the students of the
university. The objective of this experiment was the
elimination of a large number of wrong votes in addi-
tion to other objectives. The votes may be wrong
because of execution errors which the voters made dur-
ing vote cast. Execution errors arise when the inten-
tions of voter were correct before the vote. In other
words, the action was not as intended. This occurs
because of unsuitable or unclear designs. The voters
are authenticated by the biometric verification system,
unlike manual authentication. The wrong ballots are
very minimal as the design of the proposed system is
very simple and anyone can understand the voting pro-
cess very quickly. The voters are guided through easy
instructions in Urdu language during the vote casting
process. A comprehensive questionnaire is designed to
address the usability issues. The voter’s feedback
regarding the usability of the system is recorded and
the data are then analyzed. Due to the strong authenti-
cation mechanism and easy user interface, the results
show that the proposed system is more secure and user
friendly as compared to the existing systems. Security
of the votes is achieved via multiple keys during the
communication of PSs and a base station.
Electronic voting systems are very much attracted to
the hackers in recent years.6 Therefore, for the proper
functioning of many e-voting systems, the security
schemes for authentication7 and confidentiality confir-
mation are very difficult to design. Due to the need and
interest of people in the democracy,8 ensuring security
is particularly challenging in e-voting process. The use
of asymmetric cryptography9 in e-voting is impractical.
Therefore, key management mechanisms for e-voting
systems are established on the basis of symmetric key
cryptography.
An important concern that needs careful attention is
the process used for key management schemes for sym-
metric shared keys.10 At present, pre-deployed keying
mechanism is the most commonly used method for
bootstrapping secret keys in e-voting systems, where
the keys are loaded into PSs prior to deployment.
The degree of key sharing11 among PSs in the net-
work is one of the essential design considerations for
security schemes based on symmetric keys. For authen-
tication and data encryption, network wide keys can be
used due to less communication requirements among
PSs for creating additional keys. The problem is of key
compromise on a single PS results in global key (GK).
However, we have a key sharing method in which all
secure communication is based on a key pair shared
between two PSs.
This approach is ideal from the security point of
view in scenarios where a PS compromise does not
mean that the key in other PSs have been revealed. In
this approach, a unique key will be used when a PS
wants to communicate with other PSs.
To encourage passive contribution, it is important
that the intermediary PS is able to verify or decrypt a
secure message communicated between the two other
PSs. If multiple PSs share the keys intended for authen-
tication and encryption, passive involvement of secure
messages is possible. If message authentication or
encryption is performed with a pairwise shared key, it
efficiently prevents passive participation in e-voting sys-
tems. The major contributions of this article are out-
lined as follows:
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1. A new e-voting system is developed and its
usability is evaluated. The key characteristic is
the biometric confirmation of the voter and vote
casting. In comparison to dual vote, the pro-
posed e-voting system needs no training over-
head before the election.
2. To evaluate the reliability, vote on paper-based,
direct recording electronic (DRE), and proposed
e-voting system was cast. The results show that
the proposed electronic voting authentication
scheme (EVAS) outperforms DRE and manual
voting.
3. We propose EVAS, a key management scheme
for e-voting systems that provide security fea-
tures of a pairwise key (PK) sharing mechanism.
The impact of a PS compromise on the PSs in
their neighborhood can be minimized with the
EVAS key management scheme. EVAS contains
provision for multiple key management schemes.
Due to the fact that the messages that are inter-
changed among PSs have different security needs
and a security scheme based on a single key is
not suitable. More precisely, EVAS establishes
three different types of key that can be deployed
in each PS. These are GK, PK, and individual
key (IK).
4. The benefit of this approach is the minimization
of server involvement in the establishment of the
keys.
5. Utilizing the concept of one-way key chains,
EVAS also contains a well-organized scheme for
the authentication of local broadcast. A notice-
able benefit of the authentication mechanism is
the support for source authentication (unlike a
mechanism where authentication is provided via
GK) without inhibiting passive involvement
(unlike a mechanism where authentication is
provided through pairwise shared key).
The rest of article is structured as follows. The related
work and critical analyses are discussed in section
‘‘Related work.’’ The proposed scheme EVAS is pre-
sented in section ‘‘Proposed e-voting system.’’. The
authentication approach for local broadcast is dis-
cussed in section ‘‘EVAS,’’ while the report about
EVAS security analysis is presented in section ‘‘Security
analysis.’’ Finally, the article is concluded in section
‘‘Conclusion.’’
Related work
Electronic voting has gained attention over the years,
but till now limited number of voting machines have
been used for real elections.12 Security and crypto-
graphic voting protocols are rarely used by election offi-
cials. The main focus of this research is on making
usable and verifiable remote e-voting systems, which
have been neglected in former elections. The election
was set up using the Helios voting system. They per-
formed a usability analysis of Helios version 3.0 using
some additional parameters.12 In addition to their pre-
vious work, this article provides an experimental study.
In this experimental study, users are selected from both
technical and non-technical backgrounds. No advanced
knowledge is provided to the users about the verifiable
e-voting system. The technical users raised a complaint
that the information is not sufficient for voting purpose,
while the non-technical users argued that the system is
not secure and that the verification process requires
additional effort. Previously used user interfaces are
further improved for this research work. Table 1 sum-
marizes features of different voting systems.
The authors of Al-Ibrahim and Al-Ostad13 empha-
size on the user interface and on the design issues
related to e-voting system, which is evaluated on the
basis of usability parameters. Usability is achieved by
designing an e-voting machine. The election is
Table 1. Usability and security of different voting systems.





Tretyakov et al.11 Easy Moderate No No No No Low
Karayumak et al.12 Complex Moderate Strong By email No No Low
Al-Ibrahim and Al-Ostad13 Easy No No No No No High
Karayumak et al.14 Easy No Weak No No Yes High
Mac Namara et al.15 Complex No No No Yes No Low
Uzunay and Bicakci16 Complex Not sure No No No No Moderate
Bruns et al.17 Easy Moderate No Yes No No Moderate
Campbell et al.18 Easy No No Yes No No Low
Khairnar and Kharat19 Moderate Moderate No Yes Yes Yes Low
Walake and Chavan20 Moderate Moderate No Yes No No Low
Al-Anie et al.21 Complex Moderate No Yes No No Low
Binu et al.22 Moderate Moderate No Yes No No Low
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conducted through this voting machine and the results
were analyzed based on usability and user interface
designing. The main goal of this voting machine is to
eliminate invalid ballots, enable correct ballot account-
ing, and support active result revelation. The authors
of Al-Ibrahim and Al-Ostad13 also discuss security but
to a limited extent. Authentication was only performed
manually, which is in contrast to the nature of e-voting.
However, anonymity and privacy were not considered
in their proposed system, where voter information was
printed on the ballot so anyone could know who cast
vote to whom.
In Karayumak et al.,14 the analysis of Helios open
source end-to-end (E2E) electronic system is performed
in terms of usability and security, and e-voting experts
follow cognitive walk-through approach. According to
the authors of Karayumak et al.,14 usability and ver-
ifiability of Helios need improvements, and only after
rectifying the Helios, it may be used in high level elec-
tions. New interfaces for Helios are proposed to
improve the usability of E2E verifiable e-system.
Improved interfaces have been proposed for Helios,
but there are some bottlenecks in the system. The main
drawback of the system is that no back buttons are
provided and that a very limited number of voters
would be able to cast votes because of the complexity
of the system. Verifiability is also an issue of great
concern.
User authentication is conducted via email whereas
not every citizen has an email address in country’s elec-
tion system and some even do not know how email
works. The overall system is complex and difficult to
understand. It is also very difficult to use in a country-
wide election because not every citizen has access to
Internet and computer. The terms utilized in this proto-
type are also confusing, such as audit, encrypt as some
of the citizens may not understand these terms. The
interfaces used in the system were not attractive and
user friendly.
The purpose of Mac Namara et al.15 is to develop a
dual voting system named ‘‘Just Like Paper (JLP).’’ In
their proposed system, the voters cast their vote with-
out any hesitation using an electronic pen. JLP is not
very broad in the sense that it only focuses on the
design of user interface and on the usability aspects of
e-voting systems. In contrast to the JLP, the electronic
voting classification structure (EVCS) emphasizes on
the creation of a worldwide applicable language for e-
voting system. In addition, the authors of Mac Namara
et al.15 classify 26 different e-voting systems, where they
differentiates between conventional voting system and
e-voting system. The authors analyze the main differ-
ences between features of these systems. The main
drawback of this system is that the utilized electronic
pen for casting the vote on an e-voting machine intro-
duces additional costs. The use of this pen is also
cumbersome as special training may be required. The
voter verification process is also not explained in this
model.
The authors of Uzunay and Bicakci16 explain the
ThreeBallot system, which is an E2E verifiable e-voting
system in the absence of any security mechanism. A
system without a proper security mechanism has not
only some usability but also security flaws. Therefore,
the authors of Uzunay and Bicakci16 proposed
Trusted3Ballot, which is a trusted computing–based
voting scheme with three ballots addressing the security
and usability related problems. The system is very com-
plex. Extra overhead was involved in processing the
operations of three Ballot system. Special kernel is
required for the voting system and it requires specia-
lized software that increases the cost in terms of soft-
ware development. The proposed system cannot be
implemented on existing operating systems and infra-
structure and it uses bootable CDs to load the operat-
ing system and voting software which may interrupt
the whole election process as the CD may become unu-
sable after several use. Bar code readers are used for
authentication of the voter and a fake voter may cast
the vote on behalf of the original voter. The key gener-
ation process is carried out in front of participants that
may increase the chance to reveal the keys to hackers.
The authors of Desmedt and Erotokritou23 have
proposed two protocols, namely, the mod 10 Internet
voting and the permutation Internet voting. The
authors claim that the proposed method provides secu-
rity even in the presence of malware. Mod 10 Internet
voting protocol is actually a code voting protocol and
is more user friendly. Users from different races are
evaluated for permutation-based protocols through dif-
ferent experiments and it is demonstrated that these
protocols are user friendly and race-neutral. Only a
fraction of the voters is computer literate; thus, it is dif-
ficult to deploy such a system, where the code genera-
tion is an additional task of the voters.
In the proposal of Bruns et al.,17 automated tools
are used to ensure the non-interference in elections. The
implementation is carried out in Java and the programs
are secured from non-interference. As the automated
tools suffer from false positives, the theorem prover is
then needed to ensure the non-interference, which is
mostly a time-consuming process. Moreover, in Bruns
et al.,17 an automated tool like Joana is used for check-
ing non-interference and the automatic theorem prover
is used for further analysis. A slicing method is used for
program slicing, where part of the program that does
not influence the final result is discarded from verifica-
tion process. Hence, debugging process became simpler.
The authors of Bruns et al.17 attempted for a secure sys-
tem; however, the implementation details of the system
and the voting mechanism as well as the authentication
of the voters were not thoroughly discussed.
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To further extend the studies, we also reviewed the
security mechanisms proposed in the literature and out-
lined their objectives and elaborated on their findings
related to the system for handheld mobile devices.18
Khairnar and Kharat19 proposed a secure online
system for vote casting where authentication is per-
formed using registration through thumb impression.
Only the voter with registered thumb is capable of cast-
ing a vote. Through thumb impressions, all the infor-
mation is sent to the server, which then allocates
password and ID to the voter after the login. After
casting the vote, vote is encrypted and stored in a vote
recording server. Security of the voter is the main
objective of this system and it also encrypts the votes
through homomorphic encryption and blind signatures.
The system is user friendly and is secure enough.
The authors of Walake and Chavan20 focus their
attention on the online voting system and authentica-
tion mechanisms, where the authentication is provided
through Shamir’s secret sharing system. There are two
phases of this system including the registration phase
and the authentication phase. Registration of voter and
candidate is mandatory within this system. The system
will generate passwords after the registration process.
The passwords are then divided into shares by the
trusted center. Central authority and voter get hold of
the share. In authentication process, secret sharing is
an important phenomenon to secure the authentication
process. For authentication, both the voter and the
authority shares are required to produce the original
secret. Using this approach, vote casting will only be
allowed for the valid users. In their proposed system,
there is no security or any encryption method discussed
for the vote casting procedure. Security discussions are
only limited to the authentication process.
Al-Anie et al.21 established e-voting protocols based
on public key encryption, which enabled the voters to
cast their votes from their own computers. There are
three phases of this system, that is., the authentication
and registration phase (the involvement of civil status
and passport is mandatory in this phase), the voting
phase, where the voter’s information is encrypted
through public key encryption and submitted to the
government election server through the network, and
the mobile company verification phase as the mobile
phone company will allocate a personal identification
number (PIN) to the voter. Then, the election server
administrator will decipher the encrypted information
using the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) private key
to sort out the final result. However, a lot of overhead
is involved in this system, as the system requires a stan-
dard mobile phone with a strong Internet connection,
personal computer, and also the use of voting website.
It is also easy to break the PIN allocated by the mobile
phone company to the voter.
Binu et al.22 proposed a secure and efficient e-voting
scheme, which is purely based on the secret sharing
homophormism for efficient voting and verification.
They were inspired by the Shamir to store the secret
keys in different locations. Their proposed scheme pro-
vides a better way of encoding and decoding of votes.
A vote is considered as a secret in their system and
using the keys to access the encoded vote makes it reli-
able and no one can access to it with malign intentions.
However, their proposed scheme requires a secure
channel and can be solely used in a moderate system
that does not deal with too many votes (shares).
Zwierko and Kotulski24 proposed an agent based
scheme for secure e-voting and can be used both in
mobile and geographically fixed areas. Their proposed
scheme is based on cryptography and secure secret
sharing. The advantage of the scheme is that users do
not have to do computations. Their proposed system is
suitable for almost all kind of elections. An agent
installed on the mobile phones helps voters to cast the
votes, thus allowing the voters to be geographically
independent, where the cryptographic algorithms
ensure the security.
Proposed e-voting system
The main objectives of the proposed e-voting system
are
 Easy and reliable authentication using biometric
devices.
 To prevent rigging in elections by the polling
agents and polling staff.
 To get rid of paper ballots, so the polling staff
will be minimized.
 To support free and fair elections.
 To assist in announcing election results quickly.
 To mitigate mistakes encountered during vote
accounting.
 Reduced number of ‘‘invalid ballots.’’
The architecture of the proposed e-voting system
contains a base station and a number of PSs (e-voting
devices). The base station is a kind of server that man-
ages the e-voting system. The PSs are connected to the
base station via a private local network, where base sta-
tion monitors and manages all the activities of PSs by
opening and closing sessions for voting. The votes
(e-votes) from PSs are transmitted and stored in a data-
base of the base station. The process of the electronic
election is shown in Algorithm 1.
In our experiment, the voter data are stored before
starting an election, where the voters are asked to enter
thumb impressions via a biometric device and then the
data are recorded in a database. The stored data are
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used to authenticate the voter before casting their vote.
For practical implementation of e-voting system, the
data may be obtained from country databases like the
National Database and Registration Authority
(NADRA) database in Pakistan may be used for the
purpose of authentication. However, we do not have
access to such data and maintained our own database
locally. The process of storing voter information before
election is elaborated in Algorithm 2.
When a voter wants to cast their vote, he or she must
pass through three consecutive steps in order to success-
fully cast their vote. These steps are authentication, vot-
ing, and casting.
The main goal of the first step is to ensure the voter’s
identity. The authentication is performed by the system
through biometric devices that check the identification
of the voter and ensure his or her eligibility by compar-
ing with the list of voters recorded in the database of
the respective server. The thumb of the voters is actu-
ally compared with the thumb stored in the database.
Algorithm 3 is utilized for ensuring the authenticity of
the voter.
Once the thumb is matched, the information of the
voters is displayed on the screen including name,
father’s name, vote number, PS name, and so on, as
shown in Algorithm 4. Once authenticated, the voter is
able to cast their vote.
In the voting stage, a session is started on the indi-
cated PS for a specific period. The session expires when
a voter casts their vote or the system remains idle for
60 s. When a user clicks on the next button in the infor-
mation screen after verifying that the information dis-
plays on the screen is his or her own information, the
next screen that must appear is the electronic ballot
paper. The ballot paper is designed in a simple way
which contains the candidate’s name and election sym-
bol in front of a radio button. The voter only needs to
touch one radio button in front of his or her choice.
The user can change the choice before submission with
Algorithm 1. Pseudocode of algorithm e-voting
1: procedure e-voting
2: Input: blank database
3: Output: result
4: call procedure pre-election (database)
5: while (voters !=null or election-time !=end) do
6: call procedure voter-authentication(thumb-impression)
7: call procedure vote-cast (voter)
8: call procedure evoting-EVAS (vote)
9: call procedure store-vote (vote)
10: end while
11: call procedure announce-result (database, decryption-key)
12: end procedure
Algorithm 2. Pseudocode of algorithm pre-election
1: procedure pre-election
2: Input: blank database
3: Output: voter-database // having voter information
4: while ( voter != null) do
5: Ask user to place figure on biometric device and get
the thumb impression
6: m-bimage1 = image IO. read (new figure)
7: m-fingure1 = set Finger Print Image (m-biamge1)
8: m-image1 = m-fingure1. get Finger Print Image Detail()
. // store register voter data in database




Algorithm 3: Pseudo code of algorithm
voter-authentication
1: procedure voter-authentication
2: Input: database, voter data
3: Output: Boolean value // true for authentic voter and
false for voter having no information




7: m-bimage1=image IO. read (ImageTest)
8: m-fingure1=set Finger Print Image (m-biamge1)
9: m-fingure2=get Image from Database
10: mper=m-fingure1.Match (fingure1, fingure2)







Algorithm 4: Pseudo code of algorithm cast-vote
1: procedure cast-vote
2: Input: voter information
3: Output: vote
4: if (voter=true) then
5: showBallot()
6: select your choice
7: Review choice
8: while (choice=wrong) do
9: showBallot()
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one click as only one radio button can be selected from
the list of radio buttons.
The next step is vote casting. After the selection of a
candidate, the voter needs to touch the ‘‘cast-vote’’ but-
ton. When the voter press ‘‘cast-vote’’ button, the vote
data are transmitted to the base station. The vote data
are encrypted in the PS using IK before being trans-
mitted to the base station, which then stores the data in
a database. After the final stage, a welcome screen
appears again for the next voter. The voters cast their
votes electronically in the order of which they cast their
votes manually. Manual voting using paper ballot is
done to cross check the results of the e-voting election.
This shows that vote is cast for the candidate using e-
voting machine to which the voter intended. With this
method, the results of the wrong ballots are obtained.
The e-voting system discussed above was implemen-
ted at the University of Malakand, Pakistan. A touch
screen laptop was deployed to conduct the election.
Virtual machine was used to create the client server
architecture. Before starting the counting process, the
base station and all the ballot boxes were moved to the
central library at the end of the Election Day. A program
is designed that automatically counts the number of
votes a candidate got, as shown in Algorithm 5. The pro-
gram retrieves the vote data from the database stored in
the base station. Hence, the counting program was acti-
vated for the results to be displayed on the screen, which
contains information about the number of votes against
the candidate name at the end of the election. The pro-
gram performs data retrieval from the database and
other statistics in milliseconds. The credibility of the pro-
posed e- voting is verified. The credibility is assured in a
way that the paper-based ballots were counted manually
and the result of e-voting was cross checked, and both
results were found identical in our experimentation.
Each voter was asked to fill a questionnaire after
successfully casting their vote. In the questionnaire, a
few questions were asked about the usability of the
system. A few other information was also recorded dur-
ing the election, such as ballot completion time. In the
following sections, the security mechanism of the pro-
posed e-voting system and its results are presented.
EVAS
EVAS contains multiple key management scheme25
that provides authentication26 and confidentiality27 in
e-voting systems. The establishment of multiple keys
can be best described after an overview of the different
key management schemes proposed in the literature.
The local broadcast scheme is also presented in section
‘‘Security analysis.’’
Overview
To ensure communication and successful election, there
are different types of data packets that need to be inter-
changed between PSs of the e-voting system. These
packets can be categorized based on different criterion
such as data packets, control packets, unicast packets,
and broadcast packets. The category of a packet can
change the security requirements of a packet. For some
packets, the confidentiality is mandatory, whereas
authentication is mandatory for all kinds of packets.
For instance, the confidentiality of routing information
is not required, whereas the data regarding voter and
vote casting must be kept confidential. Similarly, the
messages exchanged with the server should be commu-
nicated confidentially. We claim that secure communi-
cation required in e-voting cannot be guaranteed with a
single keying scheme. Hence, a multiple key establish-
ment for each PS is proposed in EVAS. The keys and
their functions are described below.
1. GK
It is a shared key used by the server to communicate
with the PSs. Every PS knows the GK in advance or it
has built-in keys in the PS. When the server wants to
communicate like transmitting the IKs to the PS, it will
be encrypted with the GK. The PSs at the receiving end
will decrypt the data with this global public key.
2. IK
The PS will use this key to encrypt the vote data while
transmitting to the server. The server at the receiving
end will decrypt the voting data for vote accounting
purposes.
3. PK
When two PSs want to communicate with each other,
the PK will be used. The receiver PS will decrypt the
Algorithm 5: Pseudo code of algorithm announce-result
1: procedure announce-result
2: Input: Database, Decryption-key
3: Output: election result
4: while (votes !=null) do
5: select vote from voteTable
6: decryptVote(vote)
7: for (j=1; j¡=candidates; j++ ) do
8: if (vote=candadateNames(j) then
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data before transmitting to the server. The PK will be
known to the PSs that want to communicate. The pro-
cess of this security mechanism is shown in
Algorithm 6.
The establishment and update schemes of GKs, PKs,
and IKs for each PS by EVAS are described in the fol-
lowing subsections.
Individual PS key establishments. The key that each PS
share with only server is IK. Before deployment of each
PS, the IK must be generated and pre-loaded into it.
Each PS has a unique ID and the establishment of IK
K map for a PS p is carried out as follows
Kmap = fKma(p) ð1Þ
where f represents the pseudo random function and
Kma represents the master key. The master key is only
shared with the server. When a server wants to commu-
nicate the PS p, it calculates the master key for the spe-
cific PS. The pseudo random function is used to reduce
the computational overhead while computing the IK.
PK establishment. The focus of this work is the establish-
ment of PKs known only to the PSs and their direct
neighbors. A PS continuously exchange messages with
its instant neighbors. For PSs whose neighborhood
association is known in advance, for example, location
of PSs before deployment, PK formation can be carried
out easily by populating the PSs with their concerned
PKs in advance. Our proposed system also assumes the
deployment of new PSs in an e-voting system that are
unaware of their neighbors. We believe that a PS
installed in a security risk location must be designed in
such a way that reduces possible attacks to a minimum
for at least a small period (may be a few seconds) when
caught by an opponent; else, the opponent might sim-
ply compromise all the PSs in an e-voting system and
then control the system.
Key pre-distribution. The initial key KI is generated and
loaded to the PS by the controller. Each PS p originates
a master key
Kp = fKI (p) ð2Þ
Neighbor discovery. After deployment, PS p first sets a
timer Tmin and broadcasts a HELLO message. The
message comprises PS id and some other useful infor-
mation. PS then waits for the acknowledgment message
that a neighbor node q respond. The acknowledge mes-
sage (ACK) contains the identity of the PS q. The
authentication of the ACK message received from PS q
can be measured with master key Kq and is derived as
Kq = fKI (q). As PS knows KI , it can originate Kq and
then authenticate PSs q identity
P!  : p:q! p : q,MAC(Kq, pjq) ð3Þ
Establishing PK. PS p calculates its PK Kpq with q as
Kpq = fKp(p). PS q can also calculate Kpq similar to PS
p. In this case, the PK will be Kpq. In this phase, no
information need to interchange between p and q. No
special communication is required for PS p, to authen-
ticate itself with PS q, as any upcoming communica-
tions authenticated with Kpq by PS p will verify PS p’s
identity.
Algorithm 6: Pseudo code of EVAS
Assumptions
All the polling stations know the global key in advance.
1: procedure evoting-EVAS
2: Input: GK, voterdata
3: Output: result
// The server encrypts IK for each polling station using GK
4: for (i=1 i¡=n; i++ ) do
5: Encrypt IKi using GK
6: Broadcast IKs
7: end for
//Each polling station decrypts the received data to obtain their
IK using GK
8: while (n!=null) do
9: Decrypt received data using GK
10: Obtain IK
11: end while
// Each polling station communicates PKs to its neighbors
station, or the PSs directly connected to it.
12: for ( i=1; i¡=n; i++ ) do
13: Transmit PKi to neighbor
14: end for
// The PS encrypts the voting data using IK when want to
transmit. The data are sent to the server using multi-hop
communication.
15: ENCRYPT (VOTE, IK)
16: while (receiver node !=server) do
//The encrypted data are again encrypted with the PK by the PS
when a direct contact with the server is not possible.
17: ENCRYPT (VOTE, PK)
//The encrypted data are then transmitted to the neighbor PS.
18: Transmit to neighbor PS
//The receiver PS decrypts the received data with its PK.
19: DECRYPT (VOTE, PK)
20: end while
//The server then stores the data in the database in encrypted
form.
21: STORE VOTE
22: if (election = = end) then
//The data are retrieved from the database one by one,
23: RETREIVE DATA
// decrypted and
24: DECRYPT (VOTE, IK)
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Key erasure. It is not possible in EVAS that an
untrusted server may operate because it does not have
access to the GK. If it find GK some way, then it can-
not communicate with the PS because the master key
will be required to decrypt data coming from a PS. The
PS p destroys all master keys Kq’s and KI when its timer
expires. Its own master key will remain its master key
in the future and does not be removed. All PSs retains
its particular master key.
When the above steps are completed successfully, PS
p has established a PK with all its neighbors. Now, the
PK will be used to encrypt the data that two neighbors
want to communicate with each other. It is not manda-
tory for two PSs to use one key for sending data from
one end and a new key in the opposite direction
throughout their secure communication. Moreover, no
PSs in the e-voting system own KI . An opponent may
have snooped on the entire traffic flow in this period,
but without KI it cannot vaccinate specious data or
decipher any of the packets. An opponent is not able to
compute the keying information of other PSs even if
the attacker knows the keying information of a PS.
When a compromised PS is noticed, the nearby PSs just
erase the keys that were exchanged with it.
Establishing GKs. A key that is shared with all PSs in the
e-voting system is the GK. This key is basically used
when a server wants to share a confidential information
with all the PSs in the system. The information may be
a query on some event of concern. Hop by hop transla-
tion can be used if the server wants to distribute a mes-
sage M securely to all PSs. More precisely, the message
M is encrypted with its GK by the server. On receiving
end, each PS that received the encrypted message needs
to decrypt the message with GK in order to obtain the
original message, M . The message is re-encrypted with
its own key by each PS before sending it to its neigh-
bors. The neighbor decrypts the message received with
its neighbor key to obtain the message M . The message
is re-encrypted by each neighbor before sending it to its
neighbors. This practice is repeated till all the PSs
receive M . However, the key limitation of this scheme
is the computation overhead of each PS to decrypt the
message in order to obtain the original message and re-
encrypt before sending it to its neighbors. Thus, the
most preferable way is the use of GK for broadcast
message encryption.
Loading GK to every PS before deployment is the
easiest way to bootstrap a GK for e-voting network. A
key concern that arises instantly is the necessity to
securely change, GK once a compromised PS is noticed.
In other words, the GK must be updated and broad-
casted to all the outstanding PSs in a reliable, secure,
and timely manner known as global re-keying.
The communication complexity of key distribution
to individual PSs by the server via the global re-keying
based on unicast is O (N) keys. Here, N is the number
of PSs in e-voting network. To reduce the complexity
of re-keying operation, logical key trees may be used. It
is to be noted that the entire re-keying message is sent
to all PSs during key distribution, but the polling needs
a small fraction of this message. Physical locations can
be used to map the PSs to logical key tree in order to
decrease the unnecessary data. But, this may result in
large overhead. Furthermore, the key server needs full
information about the topology of the system in order
to work fine on this scheme. Suppose, we have
N = 1024 PSs. In case of binary key tree, the number
of keys that need to be broadcasted is 10. If the size of
each key is 10 bytes and a packet comprised 29 bytes.
To avoid fragmentation of keys, the key server needs
five packets to be broadcasted. The distribution of
packets is carried out in a hop by hop manner to all
PSs in a reliable way.
Local broadcast authentication. The authentication of
every message before forwarding is one of the compul-
sory constraints for a secure e-voting system. Two
broadcast authentication schemes are used, for exam-
ple, global broadcast and unicast authentication. In
global broadcast authentication, the server authenti-
cates a packet to all PSs, while in unicast authentica-
tion, the PS is responsible for authenticating a packet
before forwarding to their neighbors. Authentication of
local broadcast is mandatory to support passive partici-
pation. It is to be noted that locally broadcast messages
are typically time or event driven, such as the periodic
broadcast of control information from a PS. The next
packet that a PS transmits is not known in advance.
One-way key chain based authentication. The use of one
hop broadcast authentication known as one-way key
chain27 is used in this proposal. Delay disclosure and
time synchronization among neighboring PSs are not
required in this scheme. Initially, one-way key chain of
definite length is generated by each PS, the keychain is
then encrypted with the PK before transmission to their
neighbors. The key used for authentication in a PS’s
one-way key chain is referred to as authentication key
(AK) in this scheme. The next AK in key chain is
attached to the message whenever a PS wants to com-
municate with their neighbors. The reverse order is
used to disclose the AK at the receiver end. The mes-
sage authentication is performed on the receiver PS
using AK received before. Designing our authentication
mechanism is driven by two observations. First,
authentication of packets (control information) trans-
mitted to immediate neighbors of the PS is required.
Second, when the PS transmits a packet, the neighbor
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usually receives the packet prior any other PS receives
a transmitted copy. This is true due to the difference of
PS distances involved in the system. Once PS p trans-
mits a packet that holds the message M and an AK,
before receiving a forwarded copy from PS x, PS q
already received the packet because jpqj\jpxj+ jxqj.
So, when PS v gets the message M , the opponent x can-
not use again the AK key K to vaccinate additional
packet during impersonation jpqj\jpxj+ jxqjpqx.
Source authentication and passive participation can
easily be provided with the above scheme.
Security analysis
The security of the keying schemes in EVAS is analyzed
in this section. The survivability of the e-voting system
when undetected compromise occurs is discussed. Then,
the robustness of defense mechanism of our proposed
schemes against different types of attacks is elaborated.
Survivability
When a PS p is compromised, the opponent can use PS
p’s keying information to initiate attacks. Our scheme
has the potential to detach the compromised PS quickly
from the system using global re-keying mechanism if a
compromise event is detected. The opponent cannot
initiate more attacks after the reversal. Hence, we con-
sider that survivability under conditions where PS com-
promises are not yet detected is one of the most serious
security needs of the e-voting systems. The rest of the
section is dedicated to the general consideration of what
an opponent can do when compromising a PS. The
details on attacks are discussed in section ‘‘Defending
against various attacks on secure routing.’’
Stealing the IK lets the compromised PS to vacci-
nate incorrect data reading, when PSs send their read-
ings straight to the server authenticated with IK. Next,
an opponent can build trust with neighboring PSs when
the PKs of a compromise PS are obtained. Hence, the
opponent can insert some malicious information to
control messages in the system. However, because of
our one time key based authentication approach, the
identity of the compromised PS can be used to initiate
such attacks. The important feature of the proposed
scheme is its capability of limiting the probable dam-
age, since each station maintains a list of trusted neigh-
boring after the e-voting stations placement. Therefore,
trust relationship cannot be established with the com-
promised PSs other than their neighbors and the secure
links between PSs cannot be placed at risk.
The opponent can decrypt the broadcast messages
by the server if it obtains the GK. For example, GK
can be extracted easily if the opponent compromises a
single station. The broadcast messages are planned to
be known by every station, so the information can be
revealed easily whatever scheme for secure message dis-
tribution is used. Furthermore, knowing the GK does
not empower the opponent to flood the whole system
with malicious data while impersonating the server,
since any information sent by the server is authentic. To
conclude, the opponent can only decrypt the messages
that are encrypted with the current key. In our pro-
posal, periodic global re-keying mechanism is deployed
and after some period, the opponent will be unable to
decrypt the messages.
Defending against various attacks on secure routing
The outsider attacks are prevented in EVAS using local
broadcast authentication in which the control messages
used for routing are authenticated. The wormhole
attack cannot be prevented via local broadcast authen-
tication scheme and its prevention is discussed in sec-
tion ‘‘Dealing with the wormhole and sinkhole
attacks.’’ Hence, in this conversation, we generally con-
sider attacks initiated by an opponent inside the e-
voting system that has compromised one or more PSs.
The type of attacks that an opponent may launch
inside the network can be spoofing, repelling, or
attracting network traffic, false error message genera-
tion, and replay or alter routing information in the
hope of forming routing loops. The opponent may also
initiate the selective forwarding attack. In this attack,
the compromised PS destroys the packets regarding
routing information and forwards other packet in a
reliable way. Initiation of these attacks cannot be pre-
vented, but the consequences of these attacks can be
minimized by our proposed scheme. First, the attacks
are restricted to two hop zone of the compromised PS
due to local broadcast authentication. The detection of
these attacks is not very difficult and the opponent will
take a high risk to launch it as these attacks are loca-
lized in a small zone. Second, the updating attack is
also highly likely to be identified since the sending sta-
tion may eavesdrop its packet being changed while
being forwarded by the PS that is compromised. Third,
the compromised PS can be revoked from the system
very efficiently using global re-keying once detected.
The following attacks can be prevented by our pro-
posed scheme. The Hello flood attack is launched in
such a way that the message is broadcasted with high
power that may convince each PS about their neighbor.
Upon successful attempt of hello flood attack, all the
PSs send their readings into oblivion. Conversely, this
attack will not succeed in EVAS since packets will be
accepted from authentic neighbors only and thus can
prevent the Sybil attack.28
Dealing with the wormhole and sinkhole attacks. The pre-
vention and detection of the wormhole and sinkhole
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attacks launched at once is one of the most difficult
tasks in security assurance. Sinkhole attack29 is an
attempt of a compromised PS to attract packets, for
example, voting data, by presenting information such
as high end-to-end reliability, from its neighbors and
then drop them. The validation of this information is a
difficult task. In the wormhole attack,30 normally two
malicious PSs that are away from each other are linked
with an invisible link to the fundamental e-voting sys-
tem having low latency. These PSs fake a route that is
shorter than original one. This attack confuses routing
scheme that is based on PS distances. When deploying
one such PS near to the server and the other near to
the attacking station, the opponent could assure the
PSs close the target that they are only one or two hops
distance from the server. However, this would usually
be several hops distance from the server. Therefore, it
produces a sinkhole. In a similar way, in wormhole
attack, PSs that are at the distance of multiple hops
may consider that they are neighbors. It is a very strong
attack, since the opponent does not have to compro-
mise any PS to be able to initiate it. In EVAS, an exter-
nal opponent cannot successfully launch a wormhole
attack at any time other than a neighbor discovery.
Neighbor discovery can be used for the processing of
the PK. All the neighbors of a PS are identified after
this stage. Therefore, the opponent cannot convince the
two remote stations that they are neighbors. The prob-
ability that the opponent succeeds in such an attack
will also be very small, because the time for neighbor
discovery is very low (in the order of a few seconds)
relative to the election time. We note that knowledge of
the authenticated neighborhood knowledge is essential
for defending wormhole attacks. In EVAS, an internal
opponent must compromise at least two PSs to create a
wormhole. Despite that, it still cannot assure the neigh-
borhood of two remote stations, even after the process
of finding the location of neighbors is completed.
However, if an attacker compromises a PS p nearby
server, Q is in another area of interest, it can success-
fully create the PS q as a sinkhole because the number
of stations between p and the server becomes smaller,
making PS q particularly attractive to nearby stations.
In our scheme, the location of the server known in
advance, so every PS knows the number of hops
between the server and the PS after establishing net-
work topology. As a result, it is difficult to create a
very attractive sinkhole for the opponent without being
noticed.
Experimental evaluation
The dependent variable efficiency, effectiveness, and
satisfaction are used to evaluate the performance of our
proposed e-voting scheme in this section.
Effectiveness: this metric was examined by evaluat-
ing the errors in ballot tabulated by the contest, on the
basis of ballot and based on error type. The deviations
from the slate represent all the errors
Efficiency: the ballot completion time was recorded
to measure the efficiency of the proposed voting system
against manual system. The information was gathered
using a stop watch when the voter enters the PS. The
stopwatch was started on the entry and stopped when a
vote leaves the polling booth.
Satisfaction: this metric was evaluated through a
questionnaire in which 16 questions were asked from
the voter after casting their vote in addition to age and
education. The survey was conducted after the voter
cast their vote to know about the immediate impression
of the voters.
Materials
One e- voting system and a paper-based voting system
were used in this experiment. First, the proposed
e-voting system was a customized software pro-
grammed totally in Java2e. The easy and usable inter-
face was designed in such a way that is capable of
providing a voting experience in a simulated election
environment which mimics the real life election. The
voter’s authentication is achieved through a biometric
verification system. After biometric verification, the
voter information is displayed automatically. The
instructions on the screen easily guide the voter, where
the voter is capable to change the choice once made
before voter submission. The candidates are selected by
simply touching the radio button in front of each can-
didate name and symbol. After selecting the candidate,
a review screen was presented with their voting choices
made, which helps to confirm the right candidate selec-
tion. After viewing the review screen, the voter is able
to submit their votes. Finally, the voter is asked to fill a
questionnaire that records the age, education, and
other usability factors.
Results
The voters, whose age is below 20 and made more than
five errors on both manual and e-voting systems, are
considered outliers. The data associated with outliers
are not included in the analysis. Some of participant
voters declined to vote according to the schedule pro-
vided to them. Political ideologies are the base for vot-
ing and declined to vote as shown from the verbal
comments of the voter. One other voter was discarded
from the comparative analysis due to a technical error
that disallowed recording the data from e-voting sys-
tem. Likewise, three diverse voters were discarded from
the evaluation of ballot completion times. The voter
having minimum one ballot completion time is
Ahmad et al. 11
exceeded three inter-quartile ranges. The voting error
rates were analyzed using co-variance. In the first anal-
ysis, two variable voting systems, error type, education
were used for experiments. The age is considered as a
co-variant and is applied to the factors that are com-
mon in both voting systems, for example, voter educa-
tion. Since the age is not a reliable predictor, it is not
used in further analysis. However, surprisingly the
e- voting systems produce more errors than manual
voting systems (as shown in Table 2). The voting errors
are one-third on a manual system while the proposed
e-voting scheme produces more errors.
While comparing the results as shown in Figure 1,
transversely all other issues, there was a key concern of
voting system such that the e-voting system produced
the maximum error rates from voters. Voters’ education
level moderated this relationship among voting system
and error rate (as shown in Figure 2) such that the level
of education of voter influences the results. The low
level educated voters are more committed in errors as
compared to voters having higher education. Education
level of voters also had an influence on the error’s type
that they made. The voters having a low education level
are more prone to errors regarding choices while casting
the votes both in electronic and manual voting systems,
as shown in Figure 2.
In Figure 3, the results of wrong choices during an
election are shown in both voting systems. In this
experiment, the voting systems, error type, and educa-
tion of voters are considered. The age is used as a co-
variant. Other factors like computer proficiency,
display method that is applicable to e-voting systems
are considered. As shown in Figure 4, both e-voting
systems are more prone to errors made in the election
process.
Efficiency. Co-variance was used to analyze the error
rates in previous experiments. In these settings, the
analysis was conducted on the basis of education, slate
candidate’s position, and voting system. Here, the age
of the voters was considered as a co-variance. All other
factors that are applicable to the voting systems under
consideration were also incorporated.
Furthermore, the age of voters (co-variant) was a
reliable parameter statistically and was considered in
Table 2. Distribution of errors per voting system.
Voting system Ballots cast Total errors Ballots with at least one error Mean errors SD
Proposed e-voting 100 88 13 0.64 2.57
Manual voting 100 31 9 0.22 0.97
SD: standard deviation.
Figure 1. Mean error rate (%) as a function of voting system. Figure 2. Mean error rate (%) as a function of voters
self-reported level of education and voting system.
Figure 3. Mean error rate as a function of education level and
type of error (proposed e-voting).
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the experiment. It shows that the elder voters took lon-
ger to complete the ballots. The slate candidate’s posi-
tion has no visible influence on the results, so it is not
considered in the experiments further. Electors took
somewhat slower to complete their ballots while casting
on the proposed e-voting system as compared to man-
ual voting as shown in Figure 5. The manual system
was the slowest of both, though, this outcome is highly
likely to be insignificant as the degree of the result was
fairly small, about 60 s among the paper ballot and the
proposed e-voting system. In addition, the overall time
required for manual vote casting is quite large. As find-
ing eligible voters in the voter list and then marking
each voter is a cumbersome task and may introduce
additional delays. Hence, the time required for operat-
ing the proposed voting system may be compensated
because no authentication is required before entering
to the polling booth. The voter’s level of education also
influences the results of ballots completion time. The
voter education was reported by the voters. However,
the fundamental correlation is not completely clear,
across voting systems and ages. As shown in Figure 6,
the self-reported low education level of the voter popu-
lation took longer while completing their ballots.
Subjective satisfaction. In this section, e-voting system of
usability scale ratings is used to analyze the usability of
the system. Similar to other experiments, the parameters
in this analysis are voting system, slate candidate’s posi-
tion, voter education with age as a co-variant. However,
the level of education and slate position have no visible
influence on the results, so it is neglected in later discus-
sions. The allocations of system usability scale ratings
were somewhat negatively skewed for all voting systems.
However, more skewedness can be seen in the proposed
EVAS. This is probably because usability scale ratings
are sinking at or close to the maximum score of 100.
Moreover, the age factor (co-variant) was statistically
consistent, responsible for 8% of the difference in system
usability ratings in all voting systems, demonstrating that
mature voters inclined to be the most precarious raters in
all voting systems under consideration. To close, fully
reliable with earlier research, the voting systems under
consideration received satisfactory usability scale scores
for all ages. As shown in Figure 7, the DRE voting sys-
tem was rated at the maximum, the proposed e-voting
system at the second highest, and the manual voting sys-
tem at a similar performance to the proposed system
(Figure 8).
Figure 4. Mean error rate as a function of education level and
type of error (manual).
Figure 5. Mean error rate as a function of error type and
e-voting system.
Figure 6. Ballot completion time of each voting system.
Figure 7. Mean ballot completion time as a function of voter
education level.
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Discussion. The outcomes from first experimentation
noticeably show three indications. First, the voters with
low education are typically vulnerable to make errors in
e-voting systems. However, it is not clear whether this
was a result of lower understanding of computer use in
this test or other mitigating issues. Subjective proof from
the voter’s observation recommends that it is probably
attributable to the absence of familiarity or information
about how to operate the proposed e-voting system’s
user interface. It is a matter of discussion, however, the
results obtained in the virtual election conducted for the
purpose of the experiment have influenced the results as
the election environment was artificial in nature. It is a
matter of discussion, however, the results obtained in
the virtual election conducted for the purpose of the
experiment have influenced the results as the election
environment was artificial in nature. The list of contest-
ing candidates were given to the voters before casting
their votes. Some voters were trained before casting their
votes. The error ratio in less educated voters may be
high because of their uncommitted behaviors toward the
virtual election system. Another factor is the review
screen. In the proposed system, the review screen was on
a single page. The candidate names are displayed on a
single screen with small font size. In this environment,
the importance of the information displayed on the
screen and its presentation cannot be ignored when a
voter is making choices. In this context, the review
screen is another form of a long ballot in which the
information is displayed in a different way ranging from
making selection to verification of choices.
Conclusion
In this article, the usability, security, and authentica-
tion of the proposed e-voting system is discussed. A
new voting system is developed using Java. The voter is
first authenticated by the biometric verification system.
The eligible voters can cast their votes in a few easy
steps. After the voter cast their vote, the voter data are
communicated to the server in a secure way. Our
e-voting solution EVAS is proposed as a key manage-
ment scheme. Security of PS in e-voting systems cannot
be guaranteed with single key encryption schemes. The
attacker can reveal all the information about the net-
work when a single PS is compromised. In order to
guarantee authentication of different types of messages
communicated in the network, multiple key concept is
proposed. EVAS supports three different types of keys
per PS in order provide authentication. The GK allows
the server to communicate with all PSs. The PK is uti-
lized for secure transmission between PSs. The IK is
used for sending secure messages from PSs to the ser-
ver, which will only be shared with server. These keys
can be used to enhance the security of numerous secu-
rity schemes. EVAS contains a well-organized proce-
dure using one-way key chains for local broadcast
authentication. EVAS can restrict or enhance the effort
of initiating numerous security attacks on e-voting sys-
tems. The establishment of keys and their updates can
be performed very efficiently both in terms of computa-
tion and storage requirements. An experiment for the
proposed e-voting system was conducted at the
University of Malakand, where the students took part
in an election set up. The usability of manual voting
and e- voting was evaluated. The students were asked
to fill a questionnaire (as provided in Appendix 1) after
casting their vote. The students’ feedback and voting
behavior were recorded. The data are then analyzed
and their results are discussed. The results demon-
strated that the proposed e-voting model is practical
Figure 8. System usability scale scores as a function of voting system.
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and secure as compared to other e-voting systems pro-
posed in the literature.
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